Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi’s Iran provided decisive military, economic, and diplomatic backing to Pakistan during the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pak wars, reflecting Cold War alliances that shaped South Asian history. This pro-Pakistan tilt—rooted in CENTO membership and shared anti-communist stance—contrasts sharply with today’s balanced India-Iran ties.
CENTO Brotherhood Forged in Fire
Iran and Pakistan bonded through the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), positioning Tehran as Islamabad’s closest ally against India’s Soviet alignment. Shah Pahlavi viewed Pakistan as a strategic buffer, supplying arms when Western sanctions bit post-1965 ceasefire.
Foreign Ministry statements condemned “India’s aggression,” cementing diplomatic solidarity on Kashmir.
1965 War: Arms Pipeline Savior
Post-Runnymede ceasefire, Pakistan faced Western arms embargoes. Iran acted as covert purchasing agent, acquiring ~90 F-86 Sabre jets, missiles, artillery, ammunition, and spares from West German dealers—flown via Tehran to Karachi. US tacitly backed via reimbursements, evading direct involvement.
This lifeline sustained PAF operations through war’s final phase.
1971 War: Helicopters, Fuel, Air Bases
As Bangladesh liberation intensified, Iran loaned ~12 helicopters to replace East Pakistan transfers, plus artillery/ammo when Indian forces surged. Reports confirm Pakistani jets used Iranian airbases to evade IAF strikes; fuel convoys rolled despite India’s naval blockade.
Shah rebuffed Nixon’s aircraft/pilot request to avoid Soviet clash but sustained logistics flow. Economic aid propped war-ravaged Pakistan.
Post-1979 Revolution: India Pivot
Ayatollah Khomeini’s 1979 triumph flipped policy—trade/energy ties blossomed with India (Chabahar, $25B oil imports). Iran now balances SAARC neighbors amid regional volatility.
Shah-era support underscores how alliances evolve; today’s Iran-India Chabahar cooperation ($370M investment) reflects pragmatic shifts post-revolution. Contextually relevant as West Asia burns (IRIS Dena sinking, Hormuz blockade).
