In the ongoing Sabarimala constitution‑bench reference, Justice B. V. Nagarathna has drawn a sharp contrast between Hindu temples and the places of worship of other religions under Article 25(2)(b) of the Constitution, pointing out that the “throwing‑open” clause deals only with Hindu religious institutions because the caste system is essentially a Hindu‑social structure. The provision, she noted, reflects a historical design to enable the state to open Hindu temples to “all classes and sections” of Hindus, addressing caste‑based entry barriers, whereas similar legislatively mandated “openings” are not envisaged for mosques, churches, or other non‑Hindu faith‑based institutions.
Justice Nagarathna underscored that Article 25(2)(b) contemplates the state legislating on issues such as inheritance, succession, and right of entry of “classes and sections” of Hindus into Hindu temples, essentially targeting the caste‑driven exclusion that pervaded Hindu‑majority temple‑management practices. She questioned how the same logic of “constitutional morality” used to justify opening Hindu temples could be mechanically extended to other faiths, where the state’s power to regulate internal religious affairs is far more constrained and the social‑hierarchy framework differs.
In the broader context of the Sabarimala debate, her remarks reinforce a key constitutional distinction: while Hindu religious denominations are subject to the “throwing open” of temples under Article 25(2)(b), non‑Hindu religious groups enjoy a stronger shield of autonomy under Articles 25 and 26, because the caste‑based exclusion that Article 25(2)(b) was meant to remedy simply does not operate in the same way across other religions. The observation cuts at the core of the controversy—whether the Court should read Article 25 as a general equality‑driven tool to open all places of worship or as a historically calibrated provision mainly geared to Hindu temple‑reform in a caste‑inflected society.
